We explore a new mechanism to explain polarization phenomena in opinion dynamics. The model is based on the idea that agents evaluate alternative views on the basis of the social feedback obtained on expressing them. A high support of the favored and therefore expressed opinion in the social environment, is treated as a positive social feedback which reinforces the value associated to this opinion. In this paper we concentrate on the model with dyadic communication and encounter probabilities defined by an unweighted, time-homogeneous network. The model captures polarization dynamics more plausibly compared to bounded confidence opinion models and avoids extensive opinion flipping usually present in binary opinion dynamics. We perform systematic simulation experiments to understand the role of network connectivity for the emergence of polarization and analytically characterize the conditions for stable polarization in a two-community setting. While previous models have emphasized the polarization effects of deliberative argument-based communication, our model highlights an affective experience-based route to polarization.
Introduction
The public discourse around political polarization has regained momentum in the recent past. The fundamental divide between Democrats and Republicans in the United States and even more so the heatedness of some of the confrontations are often expounded with reference to an increase in differences in political attitudes that, seemingly, has taken place during the last decade. The rise of nationalistic voices in the European sphere, likewise, can be seen as a reflection of fundamental differences in attitudes towards the European project and different ideas regarding the »right« direction to go. These developments are very challenging from the socio-political point of view, and -given the complex interplay of a great variety of actors and entities at different societal levels -they are also a hard puzzle for the social sciences. Many different pieces must be brought into relation in order to come to an encompassing scientific understanding: from empirical measurements of phenomena that we intuitively relate to the problem to an analytical exploration and filtering of possible causal mechanisms that explain their coming-about. With this paper, we aim at contributing to a recent development in analytical sociology to identify mechanisms and conditions for the emergence of a polarization. In this context, polarization refers, one the one hand, to a process by which such strong divergences of political opinions come about, on the other, it refers to a measure of the extend to which a certain distribution of opinions is considered as polarized. The persistence and emergence of a polarized situation still poses a challenge in theoretical sociology and seeking microscopic explanations by building mathematical or computational models of how individuals act and exchange opinions has a long tradition in the field (French Jr, 1956; Abelson, 1964; DeGroot, 1974; Chatterjee and Seneta, 1977; Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990; Deffuant et al., 2000; Hegselmann et al., 2002) . In this paper, we provide a parsimonious answer to Abelson's old question of »what on earth one must assume in order to generate the bimodal outcome of community cleavage studies« (Abelson, 1964, p. 153) . The main idea is that individuals express their opinion about an issue and are sensitive to approval and disapproval by their peers. Agreement leads to a positive experience which strengthens support on the expressed opinion. Conversely, disagreement is assumed to be related to a negative sentiment and decreases support of the current opinion. In a wide range of interaction networks this reinforcement leads to the formation of opinion clusters in which agents become collectively more and more convinced of the respective group opinion. The process we propose can be seen as an abstraction from recent models of polarization that rely on ideas from argument persuasion (Dandekar et al., 2013; Mäs and Flache, 2013) . However, our model comes with another connotation as the opinion change process is not assumed to involve argument processing but change is mediated by the positive (negative) experience that agreement (disagreement) brings about.
Modeling Opinion Polarization
Modeling opinion polarization is recently receiving considerable attention in the opinion dynamics community. In the last few years, a series of possible interaction mechanisms have been proposed by which a population polarizes and approaches a state with a bi-polar opinion distribution (Macy et al., 2003; Baldassarri and Bearman, 2007; Flache and Macy, 2011; Dandekar et al., 2013; Mäs and Flache, 2013; Mäs and Bischofberger, 2015) and researchers have started to assess the relevance of these competing explanatory variants through experiments (Moussaïd et al., 2013; Chacoma and Zanette, 2015; Takács et al., 2016) . The comparison of different models in terms of experimentally-founded microscopic assumptions on the one hand and their capabilities to generate plausible macroscopic outcomes on the other is actually a quite remarkable scientific program as it aims at an empirical justification of rather different links in the explanatory chain (Hedström and Ylikoski, 2010) . A major motivation for such a mechanism-based approach to polarization has been that fact that most early models of opinion dynamics lead to »universal ultimate agreement« (Abelson, 1964, p. 153) . These models are generally based on mechanisms of positive social influence by which people's views on an issue tend to become more similar in interaction 2 . Without further ingredients, opinion models in which agents assimilate their views in interaction predict that a population will converge to a state of complete consensus (cf. Dandekar et al. (2013) ). The second generation of models of opinion dynamics try to address this by including further constraints in the models, most prominently, assumptions about value or opinion homophily (McPherson et al., 2001 ). In the opinion dynamics context this type of homophily refers to the fact that similar views may lead to attraction and an increasing likeliness of interaction. Paired with positive social influence it describes a process of repeated influence events by which »similarity leads to interaction and interaction leads to still more similarity« (Banisch et al., 2010, 109) . In the classical models with bounded confidence (Hegselmann et al., 2002; Deffuant et al., 2000) this is implemented via a threshold mechanism that switches off influence if the opinion discrepancy exceeds a certain threshold. Similar mechanisms have been proposed for models with an vectorial opinion representation (e.g. Axelrod (1997) ; Banisch et al. (2010) ). Bounded confidence can lead to a stable co-existence of a plurality of opinions in a population. However, unless »extreme« agents are artificially inserted (Deffuant et al., 2002) , bounded confidence models cannot drive a population into the extremes or lead to the emergence of antagonistic opinion groups as the opinion averaging procedure always locally reduces diversity. It crucially depends on the initial opinion diversity whether or not multiple opinions survive and the model will always end up with final opinions that are more moderate than the initial extremes. The recent approaches to modeling polarization dynamics introduce new mechanisms of opinion exchange and influence in addition to positive influence and homophily. They have been classified into models that rely on the assumption of negative social influence and models that draw upon ideas from persuasion theory (cf. Mäs and Bischofberger (2015) ). These previous discussions, however, have been overlooking a third alternative introduced in the physics literature on opinion dynamics which proposed to differentiate between a continuous internal opinion which the authors relate to inflexibility and discrete opinion expression (Martins, 2008) . We will briefly describe all three variants here. The first branch of models seeks an explanation of polarization patterns by assuming a negative social influence in the interaction of distant agents such that the encounter and communication of two agents with very different views leads them to adopt even more distant positions in the opinion space (Mark, 2003; Macy et al., 2003; Baldassarri and Bearman, 2007; Flache and Macy, 2011) . Despite the possibility to generate stable polarization patterns driving the population into two maximally extreme clusters, a recent experimental study found no indication for negative influence of this kind (Takács et al., 2016) . 3 It is noteworthy that the combination of positive and negative social influence can lead to polarization but that this feature disappears in the presence of opinion homophily (Mäs and Bischofberger, 2015) . The second type of models capable of explaining polarization is based on psychological work on persuasion and attitude change (Fishbein, 1963; Lord et al., 1979; Petty et al., 1981; Ajzen, 2001) . Persuasion models generally assume that communication partners exchange arguments about the object on which an attitude is formed and that new arguments are learned from an interaction partner if they are in support of an agents view. The model by Mäs and Flache (2013) is based on an explicit representation of attitudes borrowed from expectancy-value theory which treats an attitude as a weighted combination of a set of pro-and con-arguments regarding certain aspects of the issue under discussion (see also Urbig and Malitz (2005) for an early related model). Their so-called »argument-communication theory of bi-polarization« posits a mechanism for the co-evolution of arguments and the associated weights with the latter encoding a limited capacity to process all arguments at once. That is, only a subset of arguments is considered to be relevant and recently discussed issues play a more important role. At each time step, two agents are chosen at random with a probability that is proportional to the similarity of their attitudes (opinion homophily). In the interaction, the first agent adopts a randomly chosen argument from its interaction partner (positive social influence). The larger homophily is, the larger is the likeliness that the adopted argument speaks in favor of their own attitude, and if the similarity in attitudes of both agents came about by different argument subsets (due to the recency weightings) it becomes likely that a new supportive argument is learned. As a result, the model leads to a process where agents with a similar attitude mutually reinforce that attitude by the exchange of supportive arguments. 4 The model proposed in Mäs and Flache (2013) operationalizes a deliberative argument-based route to polarization in line with the persuasive argument theory described in the seminal paper on group polarization by Sunstein (2002) . Sunstein reviews experimental evidence on group polarization and choice shifts through group discussions and debates on its political and institutional implications. His argument is that groups inclined to a certain attitudinal direction rely on a limited argument pool which is biased into the respective direction as there is a disproportionate number of supporting claims. As arguments are exchanged the group members acquire new arguments that tend to speak even more in favor of the initial direction. In the Mäs/Flache model such biased and limited argument pools come about by an increased interaction probability of agents which already hold similar attitudes leading to enclaves of individuals with similar and every time more extreme inclinations. It is worth noting that such a persuasive argument account is also in agreement with the functional approach to argumentative reasoning 3 The experiment was indicative of a negative influence only when people held very similar opinions, which can be seen as a tendency to individualization. Assumptions in line with this finding have been investigated in, for instance, Banisch (2010) , and generally lead to a final opinion distribution characterized by small fluctuations around the group consensus points.
4 It is worth noticing that there is a branch in theoretical biology which proposed very similar mechanisms to model sympatric speciation (bi-modular distribution of phenotypes) by assortative mating (individuals preferentially mate with similar individuals). See (Kondrashov and Shpak, 1998) and references therein. Some aspects of the relation between these models and models of opinion dynamics have been discussed in (Banisch, 2016, Chapter 8). put forth by Mercier and Sperber (2011) , who, however, put more weight on the intuitive sources of attitudes and supporting arguments. The learning process described in the present paper is potentially more related to such an account. In particular, it resonates well with the paradigm of automatic (implicit) attitude activation and the learning of evaluative associations put forth by Fazio and colleagues (Fazio, 2001; Fazio et al., 2004) . Another persuasion-based proposal to the modeling of bi-polarization has been made by Dandekar et al. (2013) who base their argument on the work of Lord et al. (1979) on biased assimilation. The principle idea is that people who are very convinced of their view tend »to accept "confirming" evidence at face value while subjecting "disconfirming" evidence to critical evaluation« (p. 2098) . This is sometimes also referred to as confirmation bias. Unlike the model described above, Dandekar et al. (2013) take an abstract perspective in terms of opinion representation and include biased argument evaluation into the classic repeated averaging model (DeGroot, 1974) which operates on a single continuous opinion dimension
A bias function is introduced that decides about strength and direction of opinion change as a function of the current conviction of one or the other view (the extremes 0 and 1 are interpreted as two opposing opinions on an issue). The model contains DeGroot's averaging process as a limiting case and Dandekar et al. (2013) shows that there is a critical bias level at which the process becomes polarizing. Noteworthy, polarization may occur even in the absence of opinion homophily. A third mechanism capable of producing a bi-modular opinion distribution has been proposed by Martins (2008) . The model originated from physics-inspired models where agents face binary choices and update their opinion by imitation of their neighbors which generally leads to all agents holding the same opinion. The main idea of Martins (2008) is to introduce an internal opinion that encodes how many encounters are needed for an agent to change opinion. That is, whenever an agent observes another one expressing the same opinion, the internal opinion is enforced into the respective direction such that it becomes still harder for the agent to switch. These internal opinions -also referred to as inflexibility (Martins and Galam, 2013 ) -may polarize in the sense that two opposing camps of more and more inflexible or extreme supporters of the different options emerge. The mechanism this paper adds to the polarization literature is related to this last approach by differentiating between an internal evaluation of different discrete options of opinion expression. Like in persuasion models, opinions are reinforced by encountering agents with similar views, but in our model this »reinforcement in agreement« is mediated by a very different psychological process. Namely, reinforcement or respectively a weakening of support of their expressed view is not obtained by a costly process of argument persuasion but rather by the positive (negative) experience that agreement (disagreement) brings about. Agents form their opinions on the basis of the social feedback they obtain by expressing them. As already mentioned, the learning scheme employed in the model is in line with the psychological theory of Fazio et al. (2004) which views attitudes as evaluative associations of varying strength mediated through positive and negative experience. Recent neuro-physiological studies provide support for such evaluative mechanisms in social interaction (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010; Ruff and Fehr, 2014 , see concluding section). Moreover, rooted in reinforcement learning our model is amenable to gametheoretic considerations which has recently been proven very productive in relating agent-based models to an economic model of inter-temporal optimization (Banisch and Olbrich, 2017) . Here (in Section 5) we link to the developed body of literature on games on networks (Jackson and Zenou, 2014 , and references therein) and derive analytical results for the stability of polarization.
Theoretical Model
Suppose there are two opinions that agents can adopt and express. We denote these alternative options as o i , i being an agent index, and set o i ∈ {−1, 1} for further convenience. In the opinion model we put forth here, an agent (say i) is chosen at random and expresses his current opinion o i to a randomly chosen neighbor j. This agent responds on i's expression with agreement or disagreement depending on her current opinion o j . We further assume that j's agreement resonates positively her disagreement negatively in i. This is accounted for by two real-valued terms per agent -Q i (1) and Q i (−1) -that capture how well the expression of 1 and −1 respectively is perceived by peers in an agent's social environment. That is, the Q i (o) represent an internal evaluation of the different options based on the social response the agent obtains on expressing them. These values are updated as
leading to a positive feedback for o i = o j and to a negative one if o i = o j . The parameter α is referred to as learning rate (see below) and governs the magnitude of change. If not otherwise stated, it is set to α = 0.05 for the simulations performed in this paper. On expressing their current opinion agents thus receive affirmative or non-confirming response depending on the current opinion in their neighborhood. Agreement leads to a positive experience (r i = 1) by which the evaluation Q i (o) of the respective expressed opinion increases. Conversely, a disconfirming response decreases the value associated to the respective opinion. We shall therefore interpret the values Q i (o) as associated to the two opinions as a strength with which the respective view is supported by i or likewise as i's conviction regarding the two alternatives. Consequently, we assume that when asked to articulate his current opinion or to respond to such an articulation, agents choose to express that option which he more strongly supports at the current time step. In other words,
or, more generally:
However, we assume that agents generally tend to follow (3) in their expression choice, but deviate from this scheme with a small probability = 0.1. The mathematical reason for this is that we make sure, in this way, that both opinion options are tested by the agents so that both Qvalues are actualized from time to time; for this reason is usually referred to as exploration rate.
On the other hand, exploration seems also plausible especially when the difference in conviction is small 5 . Moreover, one may argue that the noise introduced by accounts for certain issues that might occur in communication such as misunderstanding or misinterpretation of an articulation. Readers familiar with game theory and reinforcement learning will have realized that this model set-up casts opinion dynamics as a game played repeatedly on a network in which agents learn the best response by a simple form of independent Q-learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Busoniu et al., 2008) . In this context, opinion expression should be seen as an action that leads to a certain reward r and the (state-less) Q-values associated to the two possible actions (i.e. o i ∈ {−1, 1}) are updated based on this reward signal. In fact, we will make use of this analogy in the sequel to mathematically characterize a series of stylized situations that will be helpful to provide an overall picture of the model behavior. We also note that the model behavior is essentially determined by the way in which the reward system is designed. In this basic model agents learn to avoid dissonance and play a coordination game, but we envision that different more complex and possibly heterogeneous rewards are a propelling ingredient that deserves further exploration. The main purpose of this paper, however, is to introduce this type of opinion game in the context of opinion models and polarization dynamics in particular, and to demonstrate that opinion polarization can result from very few relatively mild basic assumptions:
1. agreement is positively, disagreement negatively experienced, 2. these experiences drive opinion conviction (∆Q i ) and expression (o i ),
3. the probability of interaction is structured.
While the first two assumptions are realized through rewards and the update scheme as specified by (1) - (3), the third aspect is included in the model by an interaction network that determines the probability with which pairs of agents engage in communication with one another. For this purpose, we generate a random geometric network (Penrose, 2003; Dall and Christensen, 2002) to define the neighborhood structure. According to that network model, N agents are assigned a random position in the unit plane
and a link is established whenever the distance between two agents is below a threshold r. Notice that the density of the network depends on both the number of agents and the threshold r and can be approximated as πN r 2 for large N (Penrose, 2003) . Notice also that random geometric graphs are a special type of random graphs that differ from the latter especially regarding clustering (Dall and Christensen, 2002) . The former is a model with N = 100 agents which is also described in the next section. The latter is an implementation with N = 10000 agents where the network is not visualized for performance reasons. Notice that the models only run in Browsers with WebGL support.
Implementation Details

Model Behavior on Random Geometric Graphs
The aim of this section is to provide an intuition about the model behavior. We will look in some detail on realizations of the model on random geometric graphs. We will consider individual trajectories as well as some macroscopic indicators and show that polarization patterns emerge in a wide range of networks.
Simulation Setting
As described above we generate a random spatial network to define the neighborhood structure of the agents. N agents are assigned random position in the unit plane
and a link is established whenever the distance between two agents is below a threshold r. The agent population is initialized by setting the initial values Q i (1), Q i (−1) at random according to a uniform distribution within [0, 1] . This defines the initial opinions (i.e. what the agents express at t = 0). Due to the initialization of the Q-values, on average, half of the population will initially hold opinion 1 and the other half opinion −1. The exemplary model realization discussed in this section is done with N = 100 agents. The threshold for the random geometric graph model is r = 0.175 and the resulting network is shown in Fig. 3 . The learning rate is α = 0.05 and the exploration rate = 0.1.
Macroscopic and Microscopic Dynamics
An example run of the model with N = 100 agents is shown in Fig. 3 . It shows for 10000 simulation steps the microscopic system configuration at times zero, 2500, 5000, 7500 and 10000 along with different macroscopic observables that measure the amount of polarization in a population. We follow DiMaggio et al. (1996) in the definition of polarization measures and define dispersion as the variance σ 2 over the distribution of convictions ∆Q i = Q i (1) − Q i (−1) and bimodality by its kurtosis
Notice that the kurtosis is most often interpreted as a measure of outliers with κ = 0 for the normal distribution. Borrowing the interpretation from DiMaggio et al. (1996) 6 , p. 694-696, positive kurtosis indicates a very peaked consensus distribution whereas it becomes negative for flat and even more so for bimodal distributions reaching κ = −2 in the two-peaked case. For the sake of visualizing bimodality in the same interval as the other measures, Fig.3 therefore shows bimodality transformed as (κ + 2)/2 such that a value of zero indicates complete bimodularity and a value of one no deviation from the normal distribution. In addition to the measures used by DiMaggio et al. (1996) , the polarization measure introduced in Flache and Macy (2011) referred to as dissimilarity is shown. Dissimilarity is defined as the standard deviation of the distribution of opinion distances between all pairs of agents and is zero for consensus and one for the case of the equally sized groups at the extremes (Mäs and Flache, 2013, p. 8) . Moreover, the average opinion (fraction of agents that express o i = 1) and the average strength of support (average over the absolute values of ∆Q i ) within the two different groups of supporters is shown over time. Figure 3: Time evolution of the model. The plot shows 10000 iterations for 100 agents (on average 100 expressions by each agent) along with the system state at t = 0, 2500, 5000, 7500, 10000. The size of the nodes represents their support level and the color which opinion is favored. The average opinion represents the fraction of agents that support 1 and the support strength is the value difference averaged over the respective sets of supporters. In the definition of the polarization dispersion and bimodality measures we follow DiMaggio et al. (1996) .
Initially, due to the random initialization of values, approximately one half of the population supports expression 1 and -1 is supported by the other half. Notice that these fractions do not change a lot during the simulation even if single agents do change their opinion. The left-most network shows that supporters are initially distributed without a particular spatial organization. The individual convictions ∆Q i accounting for the strength with which the respective alternative is supported (size of the nodes in Fig. 3 ) is at a relatively low level for both opinions. The initial average strength of support (dashed curves) -that is, the average absolute value over convictions of supporters of 1 and -1 respectively -is around 0.4 for both alternatives. The strength of support is decreasing during an initial period of alignment because due to the random initial configuration agents meet on average with an equal number of agents from both camps such that no opinion is clearly favored and the ∆Q i tend to zero. However, this initial period results in a strong spatial organization into opinion regions that is clearly visible at step 2500. This spatial distribution of opinions remains rather stable in the subsequent steps. While strength of support is still small for most agents at t = 2500 (approximately at the initial level), some clusters have emerged in which one opinion is more strongly supported after 5000 steps. In particular, we observe two regions in which agents strongly support 1 (blue) which are connected by a bend of agents that moderately support 1. We also observe two disconnected clusters where -1 (red) is supported more and more strongly. However, decisive changes may still occur at the interfaces between regions in which different opinions are supported and some clusters may be invaded in a long transient. Despite support strength remaining smaller in those areas, on average, support strength increases for both opinions. This evolution is also captured by the different polarization measures. First, dispersion and dissimilarity behave very similarly and show an initial decrease in polarization followed by a steady increase once the opinion clusters have formed. Kurtosis -relating to the bimodality of a distribution -behaves differently. Namely, there is an initial increase from a moderate value towards a value close to one capturing the fact that the initially uniform distribution approaches a normal one with the ∆Q i approaching zero during the very first period. The first peak in the measure is therefore indicative of a considerable reduction in polarization. However, as with the other measures, it indicates that polarization increases to the initial level after approximately 2500 steps (second network). It further decreases but, opposed to the other measures, the bimodality indicator reaches a stable level at around 4000 to 5000 steps. Notice that the value at which it settles is larger than zero. This is due to the fact that not all agents develop the same extreme level of conviction but some (i.e. those at the interface between different opinion regions) remain slightly less convinced. The saturation of the bimodality index at a low level therefore indicates that from time four to five thousand on there is a low but constant number of agents in an intermediate regime of conviction (cf. DiMaggio et al. (1996) , p. 694). To fully understand the dynamical behavior of the model, let us look at the temporal evolution of some particular agents. In Fig. 4 the values Q i (1) (blue) and Q i (−1) (red) are shown for three different agents. Events where the ranking of values changes so that another opinion will be chosen in expression and response are highlighted by yellow stars. The first one (agent 29, located in the upper right corner of the networks in Fig. 3 ) starts in a state where Q(1) > Q(−1) but both values are at a relatively high level. Initially, this agent is surrounded by an equal number of blue and red agents which leads to an decrease in both Q(1) and Q(−1) as the expected reward (local feedback) is zero in such a situation. However, already at step 2500 (see second network in Fig. 3 ) the neighborhood of 29 has aligned to -1 (red) and from that time on the value Q(−1) increases steadily until it saturates at Q(−1) = 1 which is the expected social reward in an homogeneous surrounding. Moreover, Q(1) decreases step by step as the result of negative feedback on expressing 1 due to the exploration probability ( = 0.1). Q(1) will eventually approach -1 This behavior is characteristic for many agents in the simulation without a too strong initial preference. There is a initial phase of alignment in which a local consensus emerges -weakly supported, at first -which, once established, leads to an reinforcement of the respective view.
Notice that agents with a strong or moderate initial support of red in that cluster do in fact never change opinion. Their values both tend to zero as well but the positive reinforcement of their initial preference begins before a change of ranking takes place. Secondly, we consider agent 17 with a relatively strong initial preference for -1. Her neighborhood remains unaligned for a rather long time and still is at step 5000. In other words, the agent is located in the interface region between different opinion clusters that have emerged early in the simulation. As shown in Fig. 3 , the agent forms part of a small cluster (along with 62, 75, 76) that is only slowly »invaded« by the blue opinion. Around step 7000, however, most of her neighbors express preference for opinion 1 which leads to a rapid increase of Q(1) in subsequent steps. Finally, another node at the interface between two opinion regions is considered, namely agent 69. With an initial preference for blue, this agent first aligns with the red cluster to which agent 29 belongs and learns to support this opinion rather strongly. However, as the neighboring cluster around agent 17 aligns more and more on 1, expressing -1 yields a negative feedback with higher probability and leads to an decrease of Q(−1). Consequently, in between step 6000 to 8000 agent 69 experiences a second period of opinion changes the result of which is a slight preference of 1. It is likely that a weak to moderate preference for blue will be stable as the agent is surrounded by 4 red and six blue agents. However, there may be chains of random events that take the agent to temporarily supporting -1 again. An important characteristic visible in this microscopic perspective is that agents do not immediately adapt their expressed opinion as a response to interaction with unaligned peers. The imitation process usually implemented in binary opinion dynamics is replaced by a continuous re-evaluation of the two options. Periods of »indecision« during which individuals try different options alternate with periods during which agents show a clear preference of one or the other opinion. Yet, this continuous adaptation is different from continuous models for opinion dynamics where an »average opinion« emerges within different network clusters. To the contrary, the social feedback mechanism produces polarization by reinforcement of the support assigned to an opinion once a community is locally aligned. In other words, the contraction mechanism leading to different opinion clusters in bounded confidence models (at least if the initial diversity is large enough) is replaced by a mechanism that drives opinion clusters to a higher degree of polarization (even if initial convictions are relatively close).
Network Density and Consensus Probability
We now characterize the model on random geometric graphs by looking at its long-run behavior as a function of the network density. Notice again that the network density relates to the threshold r approximately as πN r 2 (Penrose, 2003) and density is in fact more suited to compare systems of different sizes (N ). We consider the consensus probability (the fraction of realizations that end up with all agents in the same opinion state) and the dissimilarity polarization index (Flache and Macy, 2011) to identify the range of networks in which polarization may be observed. The figure shows that pronounced polarization patterns are very likely in a considerable range of density values. The low polarization as k → 0 is explained by the fact that it leads to a high probability of isolated nodes which escape the feedback process and stay at their initial support level. As density increases, the likeliness of components in which the social feedback process plays out quickly increases leading to a high probability and value of polarization. As the consensus probability (all agents maximally support the same opinion) is zero up to k ≈ 0.05, all realizations led to the formation of distinct opinion groups with extreme support for their view. As density further increases the polarization indicator decreases due to the fact that a proportion of realization approach a consensus state. The example considered in the previous section falls into that regime. We also consider in Fig. 5 the convergence behavior on an Erdős-Rényi random graph without spatial organization (gray lines) and observe that the transition to full consensus is rather sharp in this case (N = 200). This indicates that the spatial organization into relatively segregated communities of agents (see the networks in Fig.  3 ) is decisive for polarization to emerge. This interpretation is supported by game-theoretic considerations and points at the community structure of a network as the most important factor to explain polarization in the context of our model (both issues are discussed in the next section).
Mathematical Characterizations
The proposed opinion model is strongly rooted in reinforcement learning and can be seen as a repeated stochastic game played on a network. We treat opinion expression as action and the social feedback as the payoff that an expression receives. We want to highlight that there is actually a rich body of game-theoretic literature which studies such kind of games on networks (see Jackson and Zenou (2014) and references therein) and coordination games -as specified by our reward function (2) -have received particular attention. In this section, we analyze the model from this game-theoretic perspective starting with two stylized settings that highlight its essential properties.
Decision Problem from the Individual Perspective
Let us first look at a single agent in a fixed environment. Assume therefore that a single agent i is surrounded k neighbors and denote by
as the average expressed opinion in i's neighborhood N (i). The expected reward i obtains on expressing 1 is then given by o N (i) and expressing −1 yields −o N (i) on average. Consequently, using these expectations, the update of the values Q i (1) and Q i (−1) is given by
where Pr(o t i = o) are the probabilities that i performs the respective action (expresses 1 or −1) at time t. In the model this depends on the current value of Q t i (1) and Q t i (−1), but we just notice that if we allow for exploration ( > 0, whatever small) these probabilities are strictly positive. Under this assumption, therefore, the fixed point of (6) is given by Q * i (1) = o N (i) and Q * i (−1) = −o N (i) and the respective value difference by ∆Q * i = 2o N (i) . Therefore, if an individual is in a homogeneous environment with all neighbors in the same state (i.e., o N (i) = 1 or −1) i's conviction settles at a maximal value in compliance with neighbors whatever i's initial assignment of values has been. That is, i becomes maximally convinced of the respective opinion. Noteworthy, as only the expressed opinions of neighbors are visible to i this occurs even if neighbors are only weakly supportive of that view. Hence, in a homogeneous environment the model gives rise to a radicalization process by which weakly convinced members approach maximal conviction irrespective of the initial conviction in the neighborhood. In this sense, the model captures a dynamical process of group polarization by which a group initially inclined into an attitudinal direction delivers a more extreme judgement after discussion (see Sunstein (2002) and references therein as well as Lord et al. (1979) on biased assimilation). Contrary to the limited argument pool or biased processing argument, however, our model reveals a social influence route to polarization where agents explore the social acceptability of their opinion and conviction is strengthened in the absence of opposing voices.
Gate Keeping at Structural Holes
A B
Figure 6: Interaction of two agents A and B who are each linked to an opinion community of different sign.
Real social networks are not complete. They are rather sparse and exhibit complex structure. They tend to come in clusters of tightly connected groups within which information flows rapidly, but across which influence and information flow is reduced. Ties connecting different clusters (along with the respective nodes) have received particular attention in social network analysis (Burt, 2004; Borgatti et al., 2009 ) due to their gate keeping role and strategic position which may come as a competitive advantage in terms of access to information, but also as a challenge to maintain connections with conflicting groups.
In the context of opinion dynamics, it is important to understand whether and at what pace opinions spread across different communities. For this purpose, let us consider the interaction of two agents A and B both connected to a different community homogeneously supporting different opinions (see Fig. 6 ). Notice that this is the paradigmatic example of a bridge as considered in Burt (2004) . Let us denote by k A the number of neighbors of A and by k B the number of neighbors of B respectively. Assume that the opinion in A's community is -1 (o N (A)\B = −1) and that B's community adheres to opinion 1 (o N (B)\A = 1). We leave the respective support levels in the two communities unspecified and only look at the best choices for A and B. From the point of view of an interaction between A and B we can render such a situation as a game with the following bi-matrix for the single shot game:
It is immediately clear that as soon as the size of the communities linked to A and B respectively exceeds one, the Nash equilibrium of the game is given by (o * A = −1, o * B = 1) such that both agents maintain the opinion of their respective group. This shows that different opinion clusters are a stable outcome of the opinion formation process on clustered interaction networks such as those considered in the previous section. Let us briefly consider the relation between the above payoff matrix and the dynamics (1) of our model. Therefore, assume that agent B forms a community with just two other agents (k B = 2) and agent A is part of a bigger community with ten others (k A = 10) and that A's community is in favor of −1 and B's community supports 1. Consequently, the theoretical payoffs for A are π A (1) = −9/11 and π A (−11) = 9/11 and for B π B (1) = 1/3 and π B (−11) = −1/3. Fig. 7 shows the evolution of the four values Q i (o i ) along with the payoffs as specified above (l.h.s.) and the resulting differences ∆Q i and ∆π i . The agents A and B are initialized such that they strongly disagree with their respective group. However, both quickly approach the game payoff values such that, in effect, they learn to play the associated opinion game. Figure 7 : Dynamical evolution of two agents A and B each linked to a fixed community of opposed sign. A is connected to k A = 10 agents supporting -1, B to k B = 2 agents supporting 1. A learning rate α = 0.02 and exploration rate = 0.1 is used. The figure shows a quick convergence of the Q-values to the payoffs of the associated opinion game.
Opinion Games and Cohesive Sets
The previous analysis points out the relevance of game-theoretic arguments for the analysis of the convergence behavior of the proposed model and conditions for the emergence of polarization. Coordination games and games of strategic complements more generally have received particular attention in the literature on games on networks (Morris, 2000; Jackson, 2010; Jackson and Zenou, 2014) . From this perspective, our model belongs to the category of semi-anonymous games (Jackson, 2010) in which only the number of neighbors taking the different actions (expressing their opinion) plays a role regarding the best response of a player and not the specific interaction partners. In other words, players assign equal importance to all of their local neighbors. In the context of this type of games, a particular notion of group cohesion (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) has proven an effective tool to characterize structural conditions for contagious spreading of one action to the entire population and conversely also for the stable coexistence of both alternatives in the population (Morris, 2000) . Given a network along with a pay-off structure such as given with (2), the challenge is to identify action configurations over the network that are stable in the game-theoretic sense. That is, configurations where no player independently would be better off by switching to the other alternative. Notice that in our model, a players expression o i is a best response choice if at least half of its neighbors favor that opinion as well. Cohesion measured as »the relative frequency of ties among group members compared to non-members« (Morris, 2000, p. 64 ) is therefore a direct way to check whether a group of agents plays at equilibrium. Namely, given a group S of agents such that each member has more connections to agents in S than to others (in the complementary setS), then this group plays at equilibrium whenever all members choose the same action. In consequence, whenever there are at least two distinct groups with cohesion greater or equal to 1/2 (more in-group then out-group links) in a network, configurations in which different opinions are expressed in the different groups are stable. 7 More formally and following Morris (2000) , let us denote the individual cohesiveness of an agent i ∈ S as coh(S|i) and define it as the fraction of neighbors of i that are also in S
where a ij are the elements of the adjacency matrix. The cohesion of the entire group S of agents is then defined as the smallest cohesion value of all the individuals is S, that is coh(S) = min i∈S coh(S|i).
As mentioned above, the reward system (2) used in this paper corresponds to a symmetric coordination game for which the relevant cohesiveness level is 1/2. For the stability of a nonconsensus configuration it is necessary that there is at least one partition of the network into S and its complementS such that both S andS are at least 1/2-cohesive. The intuition behind that is relatively simple. If, for example, coh(S) < 1/2 this means that there is at least one agent i ∈ S that has more neighbors inS than in S. Therefore, if one opinion (say 1) is expressed in S and the other (−1) inS, agent i would improve its expected pay-off by switching to −1 destroying the consensus in S. As other agents in S are connected to i its switching may potentially lead to a cascade of further opinion changes by other members of the group S and, depending on the connectivity structure, global alignment on expressing −1 may result. Let us finally illustrate the cohesion concept by a brief look at the example from the previous section where two agents are connected to different communities. It is easy to compute that A's community S A with |S A | = 11 is 10/11-cohesive (A has 11 neighbors 10 of which are in S A ) and S B with |S B | = 3 is 2/3 cohesive (B has three neighbors and two of them in S B ). Hence, as coh(S A ) > 1/2 and coh(S B ) > 1/2 showing the stability of the polarized outcome.
Cohesion in Two-Island Graphs
Let us generalize this example and consider the case of two communities with M and L agents where we assume that most connections are within and only a few across the two communities. Let p denote the probability of an (undirected) inter-community link between an agent in S M and an agent in S L and (1 − p) the probability for intra-community connections. The obvious advantage of this graph model is that we (externally) define a partition of the network for which we may study how the stability of the non-consensus configurations is affected as p increases. Meanwhile this setting can be seen as a prototypic situation that occurs also in more complex social networks. The cohesiveness of an agent in (say) community S M is given by
where m i (l i ) is used as a shorthand for the number of links that i maintains to agents in S M (S L ). Given that links are independently created with probability p and 1 − p respectively, each row of the adjacency matrix can be seen as the result of a finite sequence of Bernoulli trails. Consequently, for an agent i ∈ S M the probability Pr in (m) that exactly m links to agents in the same community are created is given by
where M − 1 corresponds to the number of potential within-community links excluding selfconnections. The probability of exactly l across-community connections Pr out (l) reads
Configurations where different opinions are expressed in the different communities loose their stability if m i < l i for at least one agent i, because 1/2-cohesion of the entire community rests upon 1/2-cohesiveness of each individual with respect to the group (8). For each single agent in S M the probability that (s)he is less than 1/2-cohesive is given by
For convenience we denote this probability as q M . Likewise, the probability to be less than 1/2-cohesive for an agent in S L (denoted by q L ) is obtained by exchanging m with l and M with L respectively:
For a network consisting of M +L agents, the probability that there is no agent for which m i < l i can be obtained by a similar reasoning conceiving the problem as a sequence of M + L Bernoulli trails with probabilities q M and q L respectively. Following this argument, the probability that no agent in S M is less than 1/2-cohesive is given by
Therefore, the probability that the partitions S M and S L both satisfy the cohesion condition for the stability of different actions in the different communities is given by (14) with an average over 100 network realizations. Fig. 8 compares the theoretical probability (14) that both communities are at least 1/2-cohesive with an average over 100 network realizations and demonstrates the correctness of the previous calculations. It shows four symmetric (M = L, solid stars) and two asymmetric cases (M = L, dashed circles), but we shall focus on the symmetric ones here. In the cases where M = L we observe that the rewiring probability p at which the transition from stability to instability occurs increases with the number of agents in the communities. At the same time it becomes sharper with increasing size which indicates a discontinuous phase transition in the limit of an infinite system. In fact, it is easy to see that when M → ∞, L → ∞ and M = L the fraction of intra-and inter-community links is precisely (1 − p) such that the critical value at which the communities loose 1/2-cohesion is precisely p * = 1/2. The combinatorial analysis of cohesion hence predicts a phase transition from stable polarization to consensus on the two island graph which becomes sharper with increasing system size. In order to assess the significance of this result for the convergence behavior of the model, we initialize the two-island system in a state of maximal polarization and check if polarization persists under the opinion reinforcement mechanism. That is, we initialize agents in community S M with a high support for opinion −1 by setting Q 0 i∈S M (−1) = 1 and Q 0 i∈S M
(1) = −1 such that ∆Q 0 i∈S M = −2 and agents in the other community just the opposite such that ∆Q 0 i∈S L = 2. For different p, the system is then iterated for a relatively long period of 20000 × N steps (N = M + L) and we compute the fraction of realizations out of 100 that reached consensus at that time. Consensus (i.e. all agents express either 1 or −1) is a suitable indicator because once reached the respective opinion is globally reinforced and the probability that one agent reverses due to finite-size fluctuations is effectively zero. In a first experiment the community sizes are varied from 10 to 500 (Fig. 9 , l.h.s) and the learning rate is set to α = 0.01. In a second experiment the size is fixed to M = L = 50 and the influence of the learning rate α is analyzed (reported on the r.h.s of Fig. 9 ). The l.h.s of Fig. 9 shows the results of this experiment for different system sizes and compares them to the theoretical 1/2-cohesion probability (14) . All in all, a relatively good agreement between the simulations and the theoretical curves is observed which shows that the combinatorial analysis of group cohesion provides an accurate prediction for the persistence of polarization in the two-community scenario. However, there are two effects that the cohesion probability does not properly account for. First, for the large system with M = L = 500 the transition from stable polarization to consensus takes place at a lower value of p compared to the theoretical curve. Second, the transition observed for the model dynamics is generally sharper than the 
Simulations:
Figure 9: Probability of persistent polarization in a suite of 100 simulations per data point (inter-community coupling p) is compared to the 1/2-cohesion probability as computed by (14). On the l.h.s. the comparison is shown for various community sizes from 10 to 500 with a fixed learning rate α = 0.01. On the r.h.s. the influence of the learning rate is studied for a system of fixed size M = L = 50. theoretical prediction. In fact, the transition is rather sharp already for a relatively small system of 100 agents. The r.h.s of Fig. 9 -looking at the influence of the learning rate α -sheds some light on both deviations. First, regarding the lower critical value for large systems it becomes clear that the learning rate must be small enough to match with the theoretical transition point. For a system of 100 agents a learning rate of α = 0.05 still leads to a transition from polarization to consensus at a significantly lower value of inter-community coupling whereas with α < 0.01 the theoretical curve is approached well. As the learning rate governs the fluctuations of the Q-values, these results suggest that the closer the community graph is to a group cohesion of 1/2, the more likely it becomes that one community is invaded due to a sequence of out-group interactions by which agents in one community occasionally express the opinion of the other enabling that opinion to spread throughout the entire cluster. The probability of such a cascading invasion increases with the size of the system so that the theoretical curves are matched only if the learning rate (and hence the fluctuations in the Q i ) is reduced. Cohesion is a structural measure which characterizes stable network configurations in the following sense: given the configuration of all players actions no agent alone can improve its payoff by switching to the opposed action. It thus assumes that all players know their best response and play accordingly. In the opinion model, however, agents learn which opinion is favored in their local environment, and they do so in a sequential manner receiving feedback only from one peer at a time. This means that they may deviate from »best response behavior« from time to time due to imperfect estimates Q of their expected reward. A perfect matching can thus be observed only in the limit α → 0. The second observation that the transition is generally sharper under learning dynamics has two distinct reasons. On the one hand, notice in Fig. 9 (r.h.s.) that the match between theory and simulations becomes fairly accurate in the lower part (p > 0.39) of the curve with decreasing α (see brown stars for α = 0.0001). In this parameter regime where cohesion is generally very close to 1/2 a finite learning rate α > 0 may lead to a cascade triggered by fluctuations in the Q i as described above. On the other hand, for p < 0.39 we notice a higher probability of persistent opinion polarization -even increasing with decreasing α -which points at an aspect the cohesion probability (14) does not account for. The reason for this is that the theoretical probability (14) is computed by fixing the network partition to S M and S L . In the random assignment of connections, it may, however, happen that a single node becomes relatively disconnected from its predefined set and at the same time cohesively connected to the other set. While (14) would predict a loss of cohesion of S M or S L the entire network still possesses two cohesive sets (slightly different from S M and S L ) on which different opinion are stably expressed.
Conclusion
This paper introduces a model for opinion polarization that is based on a minimal set of assumptions. It discriminates an internal and an externally expressed opinion by a learning process which reinforces an agents private conviction in its expressed opinion based on the rewarding or non-rewarding experiences made by communicating ones views in a social neighborhood. On the one hand, the model can be seen as an abstraction of recently proposed persuasion models of polarization in which opinion-confirming interactions reinforce commitment to that view whereas disconfirming interaction weakens opinion support due to biased argument processing (Dandekar et al., 2013) or biased argument pools (Sunstein, 2002; Mäs and Flache, 2013) . On the other hand, the model is based on a reinforcement procedure which does not assume any more complex kind of argument processing on the side of the agents but instead conceives opinion evaluation and consolidation as the result of positive and negative experiences that are assumingly related to agreement and disagreement with peers. The model should be seen as a »toy model« in that regard and implications for real opinion processes be drawn with careful attention to its abstractness. Its simplicity, however, makes the model well-suited to analyze how group polarization processes as reported in Sunstein (2002) play out at a societal level and allows the identification of structural conditions for global polarization to emerge and persist. In particular, the adaptive process of opinion evaluation based in reinforcement learning provides a link between opinion dynamics and the theory of games on networks which can be exploited to rigorously characterize the extent of enclave communication for which stable polarization can be expected. The notion of cohesion (Wasserman and Faust, 1994; Morris, 2000) has been shown to provide a fruitful tool in that analysis. It is noteworthy that stable cohesive sets are closely related to the concept of communities in networks and we envision that the proposed model may be well-suited as a tool for community detection and the identification of bridges (structural holes) in real networks. The proposed mechanism is meant to consider one potential source of opinion change in isolation: that is, the formation of strong convictions in an opinion based on how acceptable it is to advocate that standpoint in a social neighborhood. Rejection and confirmation of expressed opinions by peers lead to a re-evaluation of the opinion options which is mediated via a reward signal. It is noteworthy that a bunch of recent studies in neurobiology suggest that »social influence mediates very basic value signals in known reinforcement circuity« (Campbell-Meiklejohn et al., 2010) . Further empirical and experimental research is needed to assess the relevance of these mechanisms for opinion dynamics. While neurobiology posits that the »rewarding properties of social behavior may have evolved to facilitate group cohesion and cooperation« (Ruff and Fehr, 2014) , our model suggests that polarization (as opposed to cohesion) across groups may be a side-effect of these rewarding properties. In other words, human ability to coordinate with in-groups comes at the expense of a likely alienation to out-groups, which we could refer to as a »tragedy of coordination«. The fact that both deliberative and affective modes of communication may foster polarization points at fundamental challenges in collective decision processes. On the whole, we believe that linking opinion dynamics with social feedback mechanisms bears a great potential for modeling opinion formation processes in different media settings and the model presented here should be understood as an initial implementation of this paradigm.
